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What Brown Teaches Us About the
Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Revival
L inking the Warren Court’s school desegrega-tion decisions to more recent Rehnquist
Court actions limiting congressional power
helps us see clearly how social and political
forces shape Supreme Court behavior. This ar-
ticle argues, contrary to common impression,
that interest group litigation strategy was rela-
tively unimportant to both the Warren Court’s
decision in Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, Kansas (1954) and to the Rehnquist
Court’s decision to revitalize federalism in
United States v. Lopez (1995). Social and po-
litical forces are crucial factors in both Brown
and in the initiation of a federalism revival.
Moreover, majoritarian pressures also inﬂu-
enced the Warren Court’s avoidance of school
desegregation after Brown and the Rehnquist
Court’s continued enhancement of state power
at federal expense. 
I. The Warren Court 
The Brown decision’s declaration that
“separate cannot be equal” in public educa-
tion is widely attributed to the NAACP’s
“step-by-step assault on segregation in educa-
tion, which began in the mid-1930s with a
series of cases against all-white professional
schools” (Greenberg
1994, 5).1 Before
1950, the NAACP
did not ask the
courts to end racial
segregation in pub-
lic education. In-
stead, it argued that
states could remedy inequality in public edu-
cation by either desegregating schools (so
that minority and non-minority students
would attend the same schools) or by spend-
ing money on “unequal” all-black schools. In
1950, however, the Supreme Court concluded
(in a case involving the University of Texas
law school) that intangible factors affect edu-
cation, including the “reputation of the fac-
ulty, experience of the administration, posi-
tion and inﬂuence of the alumni, standing in
the community, traditions, and prestige”
(Sweatt 1950, 634). Following this decision,
the NAACP decided that all future education
cases would “be aimed at obtaining education
on an nonsegregated basis and that no relief
other than that will be acceptable” (Kluger
1975, 293). Brown was one of the cases that
the NAACP ﬁled in pursuit of its revised liti-
gation strategy.
No doubt, the NAACP’s litigation strategy
was masterful. By ﬁrst pursuing winnable
cases involving all-white professional schools,
the NAACP scored important victories that
by
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sensitized the Court to the pervasiveness of
segregation in education. Also, the NAACP
sought to improve its chances of undoing Jim
Crow in public education by waiting for the
Court to signal its interest in the intangible
factors affecting education. Nevertheless, the
NAACP’s victory in Brown is much more an
accident of good timing than of a carefully
wrought and well executed litigation strategy.
The principal virtue of the NAACP’s litiga-
tion strategy was that majoritarian attitudes to-
wards racial segregation went through a sea
change in the two decades before Brown (the
same two decades that the NAACP was pur-
suing its litigation strategy).(2) Consider, for
example, public opinion: two-thirds of white
adults supported segregated education in 1942;
at the time of Brown, just over half of white
adults opposed segregated education (Erskine
1962). More telling, by a 54% to 41% mar-
gin, Americans approved of the Court’s ruling
in Brown (Erskine 1962). 
Racial equality, moreover, became a politi-
cally salient issue in the 1940s. Recognizing
the ever-growing political power of Northern
blacks in 1948, President Harry Truman began
to institutionalize fair employment practices in
the federal civil service, and initiated desegre-
gation of the military through executive orders
9980 and 9981 (Klinker 1999, 217–21;
Skrentny 1996, 113–14). Furthermore, “[c]on-
cern about the effect of U.S. race discrimina-
tion on Cold War foreign relations led the
Truman administration to adopt a pro-civil
rights posture as part of its international
agenda to promote democracy and contain
communism” (Dudziak 2000, 27). Indeed, the
Truman administration’s brief in Brown high-
lights the debilitating impact of race segrega-
tion to American foreign policy. 
Commenting on the impact of these dra-
matic changes in race relations, Justice Felix
Frankfurter remarked that had the segregation
cases been brought in the mid-1940s he would
have sustained segregation’s constitutionality
because “public opinion had not then crystal-
lized against it” (Memorandum of William O.
Douglas 1960). Indeed, Justice William O.
Douglas wrote in his autobiography that the
Court, led by Chief Justice Fred Vinson,
would have voted 5-4 to uphold segregation
in 1952 (Douglas 1988, 113). The following
September, however, Vinson died. His replace-
ment was Governor Earl Warren.
Warren, a skilled politician, patiently led a
badly divided Court to unanimity in Brown
(Hutchinson 1979, 30–44; Patterson 2001,
Ch. 3). In an effort to temper southern hostil-
ity, the Court did not issue a remedy in
Brown I. After another year, in which the
public had time to contemplate a desegregated country, the
Court issued Brown II (1955), declaring that desegregation
must proceed with “all deliberate speed.” The Court’s bifurca-
tion of its merits and remedies holdings, as well as the ab-
sence of judgmental rhetoric in its segregation decision, re-
veals that the justices sought to improve the acceptability of
their decisions in Brown by speaking in a single moderate
voice. Brown, therefore, is a testament not just to the reaches
but also to the limits of judicial action. 
By taking into account potential resistance to its decision,
Brown also exempliﬁes the Court engaging in the type of in-
terest balancing that has set political parameters on judicial in-
tervention in equal educational opportunity. Recognizing that
“some achievable remedial effectiveness may be sacriﬁced 
because of other social interests” and that “a limited remedy
[may be chosen] when a more effective one is too costly to
other interests” (Gewirtz 1983, 589), the Court concluded that
victims’ rights must be balanced against a broad spectrum of
competing policy concerns. Speciﬁcally, aside from victims’
rights, the Brown Court valued local control of public school
systems and judicial restraint.
Brown II, in particular, calls attention to the limited reach
of the Brown rulings. Rather than require southern systems to
take concrete steps to dismantle dual school systems, the
Court contended that “varied local school problems” were
best solved by “[s]chool authorities,” that district court
judges were best suited to examine “local conditions,” and
that delays associated with “problems related to administra-
tion” were to be expected (Brown 1955, 299–300). The
Court’s emphasis on local conditions invited tokenism and
delay, and southern school ofﬁcials and judges acted in kind.
The Supreme Court, then, did not seek to provide the type
of leadership against which one can measure changes in
black-white student contact. 
In the decade following Brown, the Court’s only foray into
school desegregation is best understood as the Warren Court’s
defense of its institutional self-interest. Pressed—by Arkansas
governor Orval Faubus’s efforts to block school desegregation
in the Little Rock case—the Court aggressively defended its
turf, proclaiming itself “supreme in the exposition of the law
of the Constitution” (Cooper v. Aaron 1958, 18). In 1968 it ﬁ-
nally demanded that school boards “come forward with a plan
that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically
to work now” (Green v. County School Board of New Kent
1968, 439).
The Warren Court’s intransigence on school desegregation
spanned most of its 16-year life. Remarkably, one decade after
Brown, only 2% of black children attended biracial schools in
the 11 southern states. In the 1965–1966 school year, however,
the percentage of black children in biracial schools rose to
6%. The key factor was not enhanced judicial enforcement but
legislative and executive action.
Most signiﬁcant, the implementation of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, coupled with the issuance
and enforcement of guidelines for Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, marked a signiﬁcant expansion in federal power
over state education systems. With Title VI’s demand that
federal grant recipients be nondiscriminatory, Congress be-
came willing to supply billions of dollars of aid for the com-
pensatory education of educationally deprived children. This
aid was sufﬁcient incentive for many school systems to com-
ply with the Ofﬁce for Civil Rights’ nondiscrimination stan-
dards. Furthermore, by authorizing Department of Justice par-
ticipation in school desegregation litigation through its 1964
Civil Rights Act, Congress encouraged judicial intervention.
Against this backdrop of increasing federal involvement in
school desegregation, the Warren Court stepped up its own
involvement. This parallelism should come as no surprise.
With Congress and the White House both making equal edu-
cational opportunity a national priority and envisioning an in-
creasing judicial role, concerns of local control and judicial re-
straint no longer impeded judicial action. Court intervention
was consistent with judicial respect for the priorities set by
coequal branches of the federal government.
II. The Rehnquist Court
Like the NAACP in the 1940s and 1950s, conservative ad-
vocates, most notably the Washington Legal Foundation, the
Center for Individual Rights, and the Paciﬁc Legal Foundation,
used a carefully crafted litigation strategy to shape Rehnquist
Court action on federalism, civil rights, and much more. These
groups sometimes take credit for the Rehnquist Court’s recent
revitalization of federalism. From 1995 to 2003, they litigated
some of the 31 cases in which the Rehnquist Court invalidated
all or parts of federal statutes.3 These very same interest
groups, however, failed to shape Court action on afﬁrmative
action and other social issues. As with the Warren Court
school desegregation decisions, social and political forces, not
litigation strategy, explains Rehnquist Court decision making.
The Court’s willingness to pursue doctrinal reform on federal-
ism matched majoritarian preferences. In sharp contrast, Con-
gress’s strong support for civil and abortion rights stood as a
roadblock to the Court’s pursuit of the conservative social
agenda. Most notably, the Court’ swing Justices, Sandra Day
O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy, may well have been inﬂu-
enced by signals sent to the Court from Capitol Hill. 
Consider, for example, the Court’s decision to reafﬁrm abor-
tion rights, Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) (hereafter
Casey). Justice Kennedy and O’Connor’s refusal to overturn
Roe v. Wade (1973) seems inextricably linked to Senate
Judiciary Committee efforts to “make clear to nominees that a
willingness to profess belief in some threshold constitutional
values is a prerequisite to the job” (Wermiel 1993, 121–22).
Speciﬁcally, the Senate Judiciary Committee limited its sights
on abortion and other social issues; for example, it rejected
Robert Bork’s nomination because Bork, if conﬁrmed, almost
certainly would have supplied the ﬁfth vote needed to overturn
Roe. Also, the Committee’s “severe hazing” of Clarence
Thomas “served as a warning to the sitting Justices that if
they persisted down the path of seeking to overturn Roe and
securing other conservative objectives, they could expect
equivalent retaliation of an unspeciﬁed nature” (Merrill 2003,
630–31). Against this backdrop, it seems certain that the Sen-
ate played an instrumental role in the defeat of the conserva-
tive social agenda. Not only did it keep Bork off the Court, it
also sent a message to Justices O’Connor and Kennedy that
the repudiation of Court decisionmaking on abortion, school
prayer, and the like would be seen as an act of political deﬁ-
ance. Perhaps for this reason, the Casey plurality emphasized
both the costs of “overrul[ing] under [political] ﬁre” and ex-
plicitly linked the Court’s “legitimacy” to “people’s acceptance
of the Judiciary” (Casey 1992, 867).
For quite similar reasons, recent Rehnquist Court decision-
making invalidating federal statutes is also tied to social and
political forces. This seems especially true of the Court’s pur-
suit of federalism-related innovation, although the forces con-
tributing to this federalism revival help explain the Court’s
willingness to strike down several other statutes (Devins 2001;
Merrill 2003).
First, unlike social issues, lawmakers barely mentioned feder-
alism in the conﬁrmation hearing, committee reports, or ﬂoor
debates concerning any member of the Rehnquist Court. For 
example, the Senate Judiciary Committee never pressed Sandra
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Day O’Connor about states rights—even though O’Connor as-
serted that her “experience[s] as a State court judge and as a
state legislator” gave her “a greater appreciation of the impor-
tant roles that States play in our federal system” (Nomination of
Judge Sandra Day O’Connor 1981). Correspondingly, there are
virtually no mentions
of federalism in inter-
est group testimony
and written submis-
sions. With no interest
group constituency
pressuring Congress on
federalism issues, the
Senate has not used its
conﬁrmation power to
push the Court to em-
brace pro-Congress po-
sitions in federalism
cases. (Devins 2002;
Whittington 2001).
Second, Congress is
widely held in disre-
pute, partly because of
the well known incli-
nation of candidates to
run for Congress by
running against it. As
compared to respon-
dents in 1964 (when
76% of those polled
thought that the fed-
eral government could
be trusted “just about always” or “most of the time”), 27% of
respondents in 2001 think the government trustworthy. By a
74% to 17% margin, a 1997 poll revealed that Americans think
that members of Congress care more about making themselves
look better than making the country better. In 1992, 82% of
those polled thought that people elected to Congress “lose touch
with the people pretty quickly” (Schroeder 2001).
Relatedly, Republicans took over Congress in 1994 by run-
ning on the “Contract with America.” Seeking to capitalize on
widespread voter dissatisfaction, the Contract pledged a
smaller federal government and a larger role for the states.
The Contract promised: item veto legislation (because Con-
gress could not be trusted to enact responsible spending bills);
unfunded mandate reform (because Congress could not be
trusted to respect state prerogatives); and a vote on a constitu-
tional amendment to establish term limits (because members of
Congress quickly lost touch with their constituents).
Third, Congress has signaled to the Court that it has little
institutional stake in federalism issues and that the Court will
pay little, if any, institutional price when invalidating legisla-
tion on federalism-related grounds.4 In the wake of recent rul-
ings limiting congressional power, there has been no talk of
stripping the Court of jurisdiction, of amending the Constitu-
tion, or of enacting legislation at odds with these decisions.
Indeed, there has been virtually no talk at all; the precedential
effects of Court decisions limiting federal power are rarely
mentioned in the Congressional Record or in political dis-
course more generally. Moreover, with the exception of Court
rulings invalidating the Violence Against Women Act and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, no more than four com-
ments exist about the wisdom of any of the Court’s
federalism-related decisions. Furthermore, these decisions
played no role in the 2000 elections. Finally, Congress has
shown relatively little interest in rewriting the statutes; and
when Congress has revisited its handiwork, lawmakers have
paid close attention to the Supreme Court’s ruling, limiting
their efforts to revisions the Court is likely to approve.
Rehnquist Court innovation in the federalism arena has also
been incremental.
Only after the 1994
elections did the
Court launch its
counterrevolution,
and even then it
moved gingerly,
striking down rela-
tively few laws on
somewhat ambiguous
grounds (Devins
2001). Today, how-
ever, the Court seems
more aggressive, and
with good reason.
Congress certainly
accepts and may
even approve of
Court efforts to cur-
tail federal power.
Moreover, there is
little reason to fear a
populist backlash.
The Court remains
politically popular and
somewhat middle of
the road on divisive
social issues. Also, when the Court strikes down a law, it typi-
cally leaves Congress room to revisit the issue.
III. Conclusion 
When striking down federal and state legislation, the
Supreme Court is often described as “countermajoritarian.”
Such decision making, as Alexander Bickel put it, “thwarts 
the will of representatives of the actual people of the here 
and now; [the] Court exercises control, not in behalf of the
prevailing majority, but against it” (Bickel 1962, 17). Warren
Court school desegregation decision making and Rehnquist
Court federalism rulings, purportedly classic examples of
countermajoritarian behavior, are, on closer examination, very
much tied to majoritarian social and political forces. Both
Brown and the federalism revival match changes in public
opinion and signals sent to the Court by Congress, the White
House, and the American people. Likewise, social and political
forces help explain both the Rehnquist Court’s willingness to
extend its federalism revolution and the Warren Court’s deci-
sion to steer clear of school desegregation for the decade 
following Brown.
Parallels between the Warren and Rehnquist Courts are
hardly surprising. When striking down legislation, the Supreme
Court almost always takes its cues from elected ofﬁcials, the
public, or elites (academics, journalists, and other opinion
leaders). Court behavior in the two eras move in different di-
rections, to be sure. Brown advanced civil rights interests and
Rehnquist Court federalism decisions have invalidated legisla-
tion protecting the interests of religious minorities, the elderly,
the disabled, and victims of domestic violence. But both sug-
gest a Court operating within boundaries established by social
and political context.
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The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled on some of the 20th century’s most inﬂuential legal decisions.
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Notes
1. For other accounts of the NAACP’s attack on segregation, see
Kluger 1975 and Tushnet 1987.
2. For more detailed treatment of this topic (which helped shape my
thinking), see Klarman 1994 and Klarman 1996.
3. By revitalizing federalism limits on Congress, the Court invali-
dated statutes providing relief for victims of domestic violence, age dis-
crimination, and disability discrimination. Statutes banning religious dis-
crimination and gun possession near schools were also struck down on
federalism grounds. In particular, the Court concluded that Congress
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